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A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO KNOW: 
ARE RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS ENTITLED TO RESULTS OF GENETIC 
TESTS? 
Nicolle Strand 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Comment will explore the issue of incidental and future genetic 
research findings and the participant’s right to receive such information in 
the context of constitutional law.  It will attempt to answer the question:  
does a participant in a voluntary genetic study have a right of access to the 
results?  Thus far, there has been no case law that establishes an answer to 
the question.  Under First Amendment law, a tenuous “right to hear” 
doctrine has been described, but it refers primarily to citizens’ right to 
absorb a diversity of opinions and gather relevant facts in a political and 
social context.1  Similarly, the Fourth and Ninth Amendments are somewhat 
analogous to the question at hand, but prove ultimately unavailing.2  A right 
to the results of genetic tests may, however, be derived from the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no person may be 
deprived of property without due process of law.3  Is your genetic 
information your property?  This is a question that has not yet been 
addressed by the courts and that this Comment will attempt to answer. 
This Comment will examine claims that participants might have under 
several constitutional amendments and will analyze the validity of such 
claims.  It will compare and contrast the issue at hand with the courts’ 
treatment of seemingly analogous issues and examine possible frameworks 
that courts are likely to use in evaluating such a case were it to reach their 
dockets. 
Ultimately, it will argue that there is a strong moral reason for courts to 
establish a new constitutional right, borne out of the Fourteenth 
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 1 See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945) (referring to a First Amendment right to 
hear information). 
 2 See infra Parts VII and VIII. 
 3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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Amendment, that would guarantee research participants a right of access to 
the results upon request. 
II.  CONTEXT:  SCIENCE AND THE LAW 
There has always been an important link between science and the law.  
Our legal system regulates the way scientific practice proceeds in this 
country in a variety of ways—through governmental agencies that directly 
regulate research practices (like the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”), 
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), and analogous state agencies),4 
through case law, which shapes the future of research and determines which 
practices are legal and which may subject the researcher to liability,5 and 
even through scholarship, which can comment on the law and its relation to 
science and predict foreseeable issues.6  These two fields have always been 
somewhat at odds because the law, in many cases, seeks to prevent 
undesirable behavior before it happens.  And science, by contrast, seeks to 
forge ahead and pave new ground as rapidly as possible.  It is often the case 
that science plows ahead while the law seeks to regulate what has already 
been done.  A commonly cited example comes from the ever-controversial 
field of stem cell research.  When biologists discovered new ways of creating 
stem cells with incredible medical potential using human embryos, they 
forged ahead and broke new ground on the project,7 while the law and 
policymakers worked to catch up and determine whether such practices 
were in fact desirable from a legal and ethical standpoint. 
III.  SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND:  GENETIC RESEARCH 
One of the most important and rapidly emerging areas of tension 
between science and the law is the field of genetic research.  In some 
important ways, the law has barely scratched the surface of understanding 
and regulating genetics.  DNA is the blueprint of biology.  Each one of us 
has a code inside our cells that determines how we look, how our body 
functions, and which diseases we may develop.  The code consists of 
hundreds of millions of base pairs, which are molecules that are “read” in 
order by our cells and translated into the proteins that make up our being.  
 
 4 See generally Regulations, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, 
http://www.hhs.gov/regulations/index.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2013) (providing 
information on federal agencies and regulations related to scientific research practices). 
 5 See infra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 6 See infra notes 90, 92–98. 
 7 See generally Stem Cell Information:  The National Institutes of Health resource for stem cell research, 
NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/basics/basics3.asp (last visited Jan. 
11, 2013). 
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Our genetic codes are each unique, yet humans have the vast majority of 
their base pairs in common.  Small changes or mutations in base pairs can 
lead to differential production of proteins, which in turn can lead to both 
phenotypic changes, like blonde hair and blue eyes,8 and functional 
changes, like differently shaped proteins which cause disease.9  The entire 
human genome was only sequenced about ten years ago, so the extent of 
our knowledge about human genetics is limited and still in its infancy.10  
Scientists’ knowledge about the genetic code is expanding rapidly, however.  
The field can only progress by widespread participation in research.  
Institutions compile mountains of data on people’s genetic codes and 
medical conditions, and statisticians correlate it until they find links.11 
The most common way to do this type of research today is by a method 
called single nucleotide polymorphism (“SNP”) analysis.12  Rather than 
analyzing every single one of the over 200 million base pairs of a person’s 
DNA, SNP analysis condenses the information.  An SNP is a single mutation 
or change in a base pair that makes a person unique from most other 
humans.  Statisticians analyze common SNPs, match that data with medical 
conditions, and may, in such a way, determine that a particular SNP is 
associated with an increased risk for a particular disease.13 
It was by this method that scientists discovered the BRCA1 and BRCA2 
mutations, both SNPs that increase the risk of breast and ovarian cancer in 
women.14  A BRCA SNP can increase a woman’s lifetime risk of breast cancer 
 
 8 See Wojciech Branicki et al., Model-based prediction of human hair color using DNA variants, 
129 HUMAN GENETICS 443 (2011), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC3057002/pdf/439_2010_Article_939.pdf. 
 9 See How Can Gene Mutations Affect Health and Development?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, 
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook/mutationsanddisorders/mutationscausedisease (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2013) (explaining how changing a gene’s instruction for making a protein 
can cause a medication condition).  Please note that this Comment refers to genetic test-
ing throughout; however, it should be read to encompass genetic and genomic research, 
including whole genome sequencing research, which raise many of the same issues. 
 10 About the Human Genome Project, HUM. GENOME PROJECT INFO., 
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/project/about.shtml (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
 11 See, e.g., Cashell E. Jaquish, Commentary, The Framingham Heart Study, on its way to becoming 
the gold standard for Cardiovascular Genetic Epidemiology?, 8 BMC MED. GENETICS 63 (2007), 
available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2350/8/63 (discussing how quality 
protocols for genetic research assist researchers in analyzing large volumes of data). 
 12 What are genome-wide association studies?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, 
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook/genomicresearch/gwastudies (last visited Jan. 17, 
2013). 
 13 What are single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs)?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, 
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook/genomicresearch/snp (last visited Jan. 17, 2013). 
 14 Breast cancer, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/breast-
cancer (last visited Jan. 17, 2013). 
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from approximately 12% to 60%, a five-fold increase.15  Such a striking 
statistic effectively illustrates the power of certain SNPs to affect disease risk.  
It also helps to illustrate what a person might do with information about the 
results of genetic tests.  A woman who learns that she carries a BRCA 
mutation would be advised to significantly increase the frequency of her 
breast cancer screening, leading to early detection of the cancer, and 
increased survival rates up to 93%.16  Detection of the cancer in its later 
stages only results in about a 15% survival rate.17  Early detection makes all 
the difference, and if more women were aware of their increased risk status, 
they would be much more proactive about screening and prophylactic 
measures. 
SNPs like BRCA1 and BRCA2 serve to substantially alter the risk of 
certain diseases.  But there are also a small handful of diseases for which 
there is an even clearer and more certain genetic link.  A simple SNP 
analysis can determine whether a person will develop such a disease.  
Examples of such diseases are Huntington’s,18 cystic fibrosis,19 and sickle cell 
anemia.20  For these conditions, a person with a particular mutation is 
guaranteed to contract the disease. 
IV.  WHO PARTICIPATES IN GENETIC RESEARCH? 
There are various kinds of people in the United States who might have a 
SNP analysis done on their DNA.  The most common demographic of 
people are newborn babies.  All fifty states have some type of newborn 
screening system in place,21 and screening of many diseases is mandatory in 
most states.22 
Screening newborns for genetic disorders is an effective way to 
determine whether a child already has a disorder or will develop one, and it 
makes treatment much easier.  In most states, after the mandatory screening 
 
 15 BRCA1 and BRCA2:  Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing, NAT’L CANCER INST., 
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/BRCA (last visited Jan. 17, 2013). 
 16 Breast cancer survival rates by stage, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/
cancer/breastcancer/detailedguide/breast-cancer-survival-by-stage (Jan. 17, 2013). 
 17 Id. 
 18 Huntington disease, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/
condition/huntington-disease (last visited Jan. 17, 2013). 
 19 Cystic fibrosis, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/cystic-
fibrosis (last visited Jan. 17, 2013). 
 20 Sickle cell disease, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/sickle-
cell-disease (last visited Jan. 17, 2013). 
 21 Newborn screening, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/nbs (last visited 
Jan. 7, 2013). 
 22 In fact, all states have a minimum of twenty-one disorders that are mandatorily screened 
in newborns.  See id. 
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is done and the results are returned to the parents, the genetic information 
about the child remains in the hands of the hospital, which may conduct 
future research using the DNA.  It is worth noting that case law suggests that 
this type of future research use for DNA obtained for newborn screening 
purposes is perfectly acceptable; however, informed consent of the parents 
must be obtained for such future research purposes.  The degree of 
information the parents receive about the type of future research to be 
conducted, though, is often minimal.23 
It is important at this point to make a key distinction between genetic 
testing for clinical purposes versus research purposes.  Clinical genetic 
testing happens when a doctor will actually use the results of a genetic test to 
determine the diagnosis or treatment for a patient.  Newborn screening 
programs are an example of clinical genetic testing—the hospital collects 
the genetic information and uses it to determine whether a newborn has or 
is at risk for a particular disease.  The parents are informed of the results of 
those tests, and the doctors use the information to help treat the children.  
In the case of clinical genetic testing, there is no issue of whether the patient 
has a right of access to the results:  she always does.  After newborn 
screening is over, however, hospitals retain the babies’ genetic information 
and use it for future research.  Once the information is taken out of the 
clinical arena, the patients no longer have access to the results.  This is the 
question at the heart of this Comment.  Genetic testing for research 
purposes can be either subsequent to clinical testing, as in the case of 
newborn screening, or completely separate from clinical testing, as some 
other examples will illustrate.  The distinction between clinical and research 
settings is not only important for the purpose of this Comment, but it is also 
a key distinction that has distinct consequences for how data collected in 
either context is treated under the law.  For example, while the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) regulates 
information in a clinical context, a federal agency regulation called the 
Common Rule regulates information in a research context.24  The regulatory 
framework under which these data are governed dictates how they are 
treated, as well. 
Another group of people who may have their DNA analyzed is people 
seeking genetic counseling and testing.  This is an example of a purely 
 
 23 See Bearder v. State, 788 N.W.2d 144, 149 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) rev’d, 806 N.W.2d 766 
(Minn. 2011) (“[T]he health department pamphlet informs new parents that [a]ny bit of 
leftover blood (without baby’s personal information) may be used for public health 
studies and research to improve screening and protect babies.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 24 PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, PRIVACY AND PROGRESS IN 
WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING 63 (2012), available at http://bioethics.gov/cms/sites/
default/files/PrivacyProgress508_1.pdf. 
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clinical genetic test.  If a genetic disease is suspected based on family history 
or another factor, a pregnant woman or any adult may have a specific 
genetic test conducted.  This type of test usually goes hand-in-hand with a 
counseling session conducted by a certified genetic counselor, who talks to 
the patient and helps her understand the potential consequences of getting 
the test done and walks her through the implications of the results.25 
A third group of people who may have their genetic information 
analyzed is people who sign up for a direct-to-consumer genetic testing 
service, another form of clinical testing (although, admittedly, much 
different from the “clinical” context we normally associate with a doctor’s 
office, and, it should be noted, not governed by HIPAA).  These services, 
like the most popular “23 and Me,” are usually websites that require a 
subscription fee.  People send in saliva samples, and a lab analyzes their 
DNA for any known disease correlations and usually also conducts ancestry 
analysis and other kinds of analyses.  The person views all of their 
information on the website, which is constantly updated when new science 
indicates a new DNA association.26 
And finally, the last group of people likely to have their DNA analyzed is 
voluntary adult research participants.  Adult genetic research can be 
gathered in two ways.  First, genetic research can be conducted within the 
confines of a completely voluntary research study, such as the Framingham 
Heart Study.27  These people are generally healthy and simply donate their 
time and information to the advancement of medical research.  Second, 
genetic research can be conducted on people who have come into a hospital 
for a medical procedure such as a surgery, and who sign a consent form 
allowing the hospital to use their tissue or blood sample to conduct future 
research. 
Both of these scenarios—genetic research as a part of a voluntary study 
and genetic research subsequent to a clinical encounter—will constitute the 
main focus of the questions posed in this Comment.  In each scenario, the 
research participant has relinquished control of his DNA to the hospital or 
research institution, who will use it for large statistical genetic correlation 
research.  However, in each scenario, the institution also possesses 
knowledge about the research participants that the individuals do not know, 
and may never otherwise learn.  In the case of a mutation like BRCA, a 
person may always go out on their own and seek genetic testing and 
 
 25 Genetic counseling, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/
glossary=geneticcounseling (last visited Jan. 7, 2013). 
 26 KEVIN DAVIES, THE $1,000 GENOME:  THE REVOLUTION IN DNA SEQUENCING AND THE NEW 
ERA OF PERSONALIZED MEDICINE 32–33 (2010). 
 27 See generally Nicolle Strand, Genetic Notification at the Framingham Heart Study (Apr. 
2010) (unpublished undergraduate thesis, Wellesley College) (on file with author). 
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counseling, or use a service like “23 and Me” to determine whether they 
have the SNP; they do not technically need to derive the information from 
the research institution.  However, such services cost money, and most 
people never believe that they have reason to use them.  In addition, 
institutions will discover correlations in the course of research that are not 
widely tested for clinical purposes.  In other words, the option may not exist 
for the participant to go out on his own and seek the information in a 
clinical setting.  In such a case, the only chance of an individual learning 
whether he possesses such a mutation, and what it might mean, lies in the 
hands of the research institution.  Whether such an individual deserves 
access to the results is the question at the heart of this issue. 
V.  GENETICS AND OTHER LEGAL ISSUES 
Genetic research is a potential minefield of legal issues.  Federal and 
state legislatures have already anticipated some of the major legal hang-ups 
that genetic research will face.  That is why, in 2008, Congress passed the 
Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act (“GINA”), which ensures 
people’s privacy in the arena of genetic testing, and prohibits employers and 
health insurers from discriminating on the basis of genetic information.28  In 
addition to GINA, many state legislatures have passed even more stringent 
privacy laws concerning genetic information.29 
Privacy is of particular concern in the realm of genetic research, as 
common sense would suggest.  As outlined above, genetic information can 
be obtained for either clinical or research purposes.  But oftentimes, in a 
hospital setting, even information obtained for clinical purposes (that is, 
diagnosis and treatment, with the intent to reveal all pertinent information 
to the patient), may be used later for research purposes if the patient 
consents.30  Common research practice is to de-identify the samples, and 
therefore conduct the research completely anonymously, once the 
information is outside of the clinical setting.31  However, in the case of 
genetic research, de-identification can only go so far.  Of course, if you are a 
scientist analyzing a person’s DNA, it is of the utmost importance to know 
where that DNA came from.  The person’s sex, age, race, ethnicity, and all 
the details of their health status are key to analyzing the genetic information 
 
 28 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 112 Stat. 881 
(codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 29 See PRIVACY AND PROGRESS IN WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING, supra note 24, app. IV 
(summarizing the applicable laws of the fifty states). 
 30 How does genetic testing in a research setting differ from clinical genetic testing?, GENETICS HOME 
REFERENCE (Jan. 7, 2013), http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook/testing/researchtesting. 
 31 See, e.g., Daniel Levy et al., Consent for Genetic Research in the Framingham Heart Study, 152 
AM. J. MED. GENETICS, Pt. A 1250, 1255 (2010). 
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and making correlations.  So, while a person’s name and social security 
number do not go along with his genetic information in a research setting, 
essentially everything else about him does.32  This fact raises concerns about 
the privacy of genetic information, some of which have been anticipated by 
the law, others of which have not, but neither of which are the subject of this 
Comment.33 
Other laws of a more generic quality may apply to genetic research as 
well.  For example, informed consent is one of the tenets of ethical and legal 
research in this country, especially in an area as complicated and poorly 
understood as genetics.34  In addition, basic laws about the confidentiality of 
medical information are also important to genetic research.35  Again, these 
are important concerns that also lie at the intersection of genetics and the 
law, but they will not be the focus of this Comment. 
VI.  ACCESS TO GENETIC RESEARCH RESULTS 
But there is one important issue that the legal landscape has not yet 
addressed with regards to genetic testing—what happens to people’s 
research results?  In the case of newborn screening, for example, the results 
of that initial test are reported to the parents and to the newborn’s physician 
in order to proceed appropriately with diagnosis and treatment.  But once 
parents consent to the newborn’s DNA being used for future research 
purposes, the information leaves the clinical arena.  Any further information 
that is discovered about the baby will not be reported to the parents or to 
the physician.  The baby and her family may never know that she has a 
genetic mutation predisposing her to a certain disease, even though 
someone, somewhere, possesses such information.36  Common practice in 
almost every hospital and research institution around the country is not to 
report genetic research results to participants.37 
This practice differs markedly from the disclosure of research results that 
are not genetic in nature.  When competent adults volunteer for a research 
study, they understand that the tests being conducted are being used for 
research purposes, not clinical ones.  They are informed that they need to 
 
 32 Id. 
 33 See PRIVACY AND PROGRESS IN WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING, supra note 24, at 64 
(explaining why the de-identification of genetic information is not foolproof). 
 34 Levy, supra note 31, at 1250. 
 35 See infra note 93. 
 36 See Kenneth D. Mandl, Newborn Screening Program Practices in the United States:  Notification, 
Research, and Consent, 109 PEDIATRICS 269 (2002) (finding that only some states report 
results to parents). 
 37 See Karen J. Maschke, Biobanks:  DNA and Research, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND BENCH 
TO CLINIC:  THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR JOURNALISTS, 
POLICYMAKERS, AND CAMPAIGNS 11, 13 (Mary Crowley ed., 2008). 
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continue seeing a regular doctor, and that the diagnostic procedures taking 
place in the research laboratory are not meant to replace their annual 
check-ups.  However, it is unquestionably the common practice of ethical 
research institutions to report clinically significant research results to 
participants when they are discovered.38  It is undeniably unethical, for 
example, for researchers to withhold information about a participants’ high 
blood pressure or high cholesterol—or, in the case of a magnetic resonance 
imaging (“MRI”) study, undeniably unethical for a researcher not to disclose 
an abnormal radiological finding.  Why, then, is the common practice in the 
case of genetic information so markedly different?  If a researcher knows 
that a participant has the BRCA1 gene, predisposing her to breast cancer, 
there is no institution in this country that would report this result to the 
participant. 
One could examine thoroughly the ethical dimensions of this fascinating 
fact.  This Comment, though, will focus on the legal dimensions, particularly 
those deriving from constitutional law.  Specifically:  if a participant seeks 
access to her genetic research results, does she have a constitutional right to 
receive them? 
Under what authority is constitutional law implicated?  A significant 
percent of scientific research in this country occurs by government grant.39  
One of the largest DNA databanks in the world is maintained by the NIH.40  
In other words, when a person in this country participates in a genetic 
research study, the government subsequently possesses her genetic research 
results, and almost always withholds participant notification of them.  
Therefore, in most cases, it is the state itself against which a research 
participant would bring a lawsuit for right of access to research results.  No 
court, federal or state, has yet addressed the issue of a right of access to 
research results that are solely genetic in nature.41  This Comment will 
examine the various arguments that a plaintiff might use in order to assert 
this right of access.  It will assess the relative strengths or weaknesses of these 
constitutional claims, examine the likely framework courts would use to 
analyze such a case were it to reach a court’s docket, and ultimately decide 
whether there should be a recognized constitutional right of access. 
 
 38 See Strand, supra note 27, at 38. 
 39 Hamilton Moses III, et al., Financial Anatomy of Biomedical Research, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 
1333 (2005). 
 40 Jocelyn Kaiser, NIH Unperturbed by New Way of Peering Into Personal Genomic Data, 
SCIENCEINSIDER (Apr. 10, 2012, 5:09 PM) http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/
2012/04/nih-unperturbed-by-new-way.html.; dbGaP, NAT’L CENTER BIOTECHNOGY INFO., 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/gap (last visited Jan. 17, 2013). 
 41 Matthew P. Gordon, A Legal Duty to Disclose Individual Research Findings to Research Subjects?, 
64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 225, 233 (2009).  At the time of publication, the Author was unable 
to find any cases that directly addressed the issue.  
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VII.  FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution primarily protects the 
freedom of speech.42  It may seem counterintuitive that access to genetically 
based research results would have anything to do with the freedom of 
speech.  But, while the majority of the courts’ jurisprudence has focused on 
the speaker’s right to speak, there is a distinct minority of jurisprudence that 
describes certain instances in which there is, instead, a listener’s right to 
hear.43  Can the loosely defined “right to hear” doctrine be applied to this 
particular situation regarding disclosure of research results? 
There are several cases in which plaintiffs have sought access to medical 
records under the First Amendment “right to hear” doctrine.44  The primary 
case in which a federal court considered this analysis in the medical context 
is Gotkin v. Miller.45  In Gotkin, the plaintiff wished to seize her mental health 
records from various state hospitals at which she had been a patient.46  The 
plaintiff and her husband were writing a book documenting the plaintiff’s 
experience with the mental health care system, and wanted access to the 
records in order to verify certain details for the book.47  The court 
entertained the plaintiff’s claims on several constitutional bases—one of 
which was the First Amendment right to receive or hear information and 
ideas.  The court explained that the right to receive information is a 
“necessary corollary” to the basic right of free speech.48  For example, in 
Thomas v. Collins, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that, in the case of 
labor organizers, requiring registration before recruitment was 
unconstitutional both because of the organizers’ right to free speech and 
because of the workers’ right to receive the information.49  But the court in 
Gotkin explained that most of the “vitality and justification” for the court’s 
“right to hear” jurisprudence comes from circumstances in which the 
information or ideas implicated are of public importance.50  In fact, the 
court cited a law review article which explains, more clearly than the Thomas 
Court had, that the “right to hear” is only recognized when the following 
conditions are met:  (1) the issue to be discussed surrounds a public figure 
 
 42 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 43 See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945). 
 44 See, e.g., Gotkin v. Miller, 379 F. Supp. 859, 862–63 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (describing situations 
where the “right to hear” has been recognized); Ramirez v. Delcore, No. C-07-48, 2007 
WL 2142293, at *7 (S.D. Tex. July 25, 2007) (denying a due process claim regarding 
access to medical records). 
 45 Gotkin, 379 F. Supp. at 859. 
 46 Id. at 861. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 862–63. 
 49 See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945). 
 50 Gotkin, 379 F. Supp. at 863. 
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or has a larger social importance, (2) the speaker wants to be heard, and (3) 
the listeners are not forced to listen—they may ignore or walk away from the 
speaker.51  Interestingly, the court in Gotkin ended the analysis there, without 
explicitly discussing each of the three requirements for the triggering of the 
“right to hear” doctrine and why they are not met in this case.  Within the 
context of Gotkin, the larger issue is whether or not a former mental patient 
should have access to medical records made about him.  It seems clear that 
at least the third condition listed above is met in that context.  The listener 
may choose to request medical records about himself, or not.  This ability to 
control whether he has access to the records is tantamount to the ability to 
ignore the information.  And, while in Gotkin itself, the state hospitals did 
not wish to share the records with the plaintiff, it is conceivable that a 
hospital would desire to share the records, but that a state or local policy 
would prohibit it from doing so.  This would amount to a fulfillment of the 
second condition.  And finally, it is not entirely clear that there is no 
justification for fulfillment of the first condition.  While a person may seek 
access to his records simply for personal use and review, in this case, the 
plaintiff sought access in order to publish a book that explained the 
experience of a mental patient and the inner workings of the mental health 
system.  It is at least arguable that a record used for such a purpose does in 
fact have a larger public social value.  It is interesting that the court simply 
rejects the argument under the “right to hear” doctrine without more 
systematically analyzing it. 
The issue of disclosure of genetic research results is very similar to the 
disclosure of mental hospital medical records.  Genetic research results and 
mental health records are both confidential in nature and concern a 
primarily private matter.  Both are relatively sensitive in nature, in a way that 
perhaps a normal hospital admittance medical record might not be.  In 
addition, both are conceivably of much greater value to the person seeking 
the information than a normal hospital admittance record would be.  A 
person who visits the doctor’s office for a certain kind of pain, for example, 
is usually perfectly coherent when the doctor examines him, asks him 
questions about the nature and duration of the pain, and explains to him 
the potential diagnoses and treatment options.  The medical records that 
detail the doctor’s thought process as his examination is occurring are likely 
to match up quite well with the patient’s own recollection of what occurred.  
As a result, access to those records has relatively low value.  But a patient 
who is admitted to a mental hospital may be in such a state as to be 
practically unaware of the doctors’ examinations and procedures.  Similarly, 
 
 51 Id. (citing John M. Steel, Comment, Freedom to Hear:  A Political Justification of the First 
Amendment, 46 WASH. L. REV. 311, 340–41 (1971)). 
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the results of a genetic test are completely unknown to the patient or 
research participant, absent disclosure.  For people seeking access to 
information, genetic research results and mental health patient records are 
both of high potential value for the seeker. 
Ultimately, while the issues of access to mental health records and access 
to genetic research results are quite similar in nature, it is likely that those 
who seek disclosure of their genetic research results would lose a claim 
under the First Amendment.  In a predictive sense, as the district court 
made clear in Gotkin, courts are not likely to take these types of claims 
seriously.52  The “right to hear” doctrine is extremely limited and not likely 
to be expanded to something such as this, where the matter at hand seems 
so inherently private.  And, in an ethical sense, it is not clear that the values 
underpinning the First Amendment are truly implicated in cases such as 
these.  Primarily, the First Amendment protects a person’s right to speak—to 
disseminate information and ideas at will.53  Although there is no hard data 
to quantify such a claim, experience and the general attitudes of scientists 
and doctors make it doubtful that many geneticists wish that they could 
disclose any research results to participants at all.  In fact, a working group 
of the National Heart Lung and Blood Institute, a subset of the NIH, 
proposed a very specific set of characteristics of a genetic mutation that 
would maximize the benefit and minimize the harm of notifying the 
participant.54  Very few SNPs currently meet this criteria.  If the researchers 
themselves do not believe that dissemination of such information is of public 
value, then one might argue that the First Amendment is not implicated at 
all.  A corollary issue is the right not to know.  It may not be of great 
significance to the focus of this Comment, but it should be noted that case 
law in the health sciences arena has recognized that a person may 
competently waive his right to know, and should be given such an option.55  
The right not to know, although not explicitly derived from the First 
Amendment, appears to be stronger than any notion of the right to hear or 
receive information. 
 
 52 Gotkin, 379 F. Supp at 868–69. 
 53 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 54 See generally Ebony B. Bookman et al., Reporting Genetic Results in Research Studies:  Summary 
and Recommendations of an NHLBI Working Group, 140 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 1033, part A 
(2006) (explaining that there are certain criteria that make a particular genetic mutation 
notifiable and that such stringent criteria are rarely met). 
 55 See Laskowitz v. CIBA Vision Corp., 632 N.Y.S.2d 845, 847 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).  A 
constitutional right to receive the results of genetic tests would not preclude participants 
who did not wish to learn their results from exercising their right not to know. 
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VIII.  FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 
The Fourth Amendment stands for the proposition that a person may 
not be subject to an unreasonable search or seizure of his property or 
person.56  Although a federal court of appeals case does indicate that 
obtaining blood for the purposes of DNA testing may constitute a search, 
which implicates the Fourth Amendment,57 cases involving patients’ right of 
access to medical records dismiss claims arising from search and seizure 
grounds.58  The court in Gotkin, for example, summarily dismisses the 
plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim on two grounds.59  First, a hospital’s 
retention of medical records is not a seizure because searches and seizures 
have been defined primarily in the criminal context, and because the 
hospital itself created the records, so it has not technically “seized” anything 
from the patient.  And second, even if it were defined as a seizure, it is not 
unreasonable.60  The court was correct—even if it could be argued that 
refusal to release the records was itself a seizure, it is surely a reasonable one.  
But the court ends the analysis here, without explaining why exactly this 
kind of seizure could never be considered unreasonable.  In the Fourth 
Amendment criminal context, searches and seizures become reasonable if 
the government has a warrant and probable cause.61  In this kind of civil 
context, it could be argued that the counterpart to probable cause is 
consent.  A patient entering a hospital implicitly consents to a record being 
drafted that documents his visit.  Similarly, a research participant explicitly 
consents to his DNA being tested when he signs a consent form.  This 
consent clearly renders the retention of the information about the patient 
or participant not unreasonable.  Ultimately, given the fact that the 
information that is the result of a genetic test is generated by the laboratory, 
not directly “seized” from the participant, and the fact that protections like 
informed consent are in place which give researchers the ethical and legal 
right to use the information, a right of access claim is not likely to succeed 
on Fourth Amendment grounds. 
 
 56 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 57 See Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 658 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment applies to DNA testing and rejecting the district court’s suggestion that 
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a person’s DNA). 
 58 See, e.g., Ramirez v. Delcore, 267 F. App’x 335, 335 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that the 
defendant-prisoner has no “state-created interest in obtaining his medical records”); 
Gotkin v. Miller, 379 F. Supp. 859 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). 
 59 Gotkin, 379 F. Supp. at 863. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt:  Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 MICH. L. REV. 291, 314 
(2010). 
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IX.  NINTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Amendment, which simply states that:  “The enumeration in 
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people,”62 has been interpreted differently 
in different contexts.  In the famous case Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice 
Goldberg’s concurring opinion refers to a right, derived from the Ninth 
Amendment, to a zone of privacy within one’s house and home.63  This 
Ninth Amendment right to privacy has developed further since that time.  
Plaintiffs in right of access to medical records cases sometimes bring claims 
under the Ninth Amendment, but never to any avail.  In Gotkin, the court 
summarily dismissed the Ninth Amendment right to privacy claim as 
“patently without merit” and, in fact, pointed out that the very right sought 
to be protected by the Ninth Amendment was in danger of being violated by 
the release of medical records to the plaintiffs.64  Similarly, in the case of 
research studies, a participant’s claim of access to genetic research results 
would be wholly unaided by a Ninth Amendment right to privacy argument, 
simply because, while privacy issues may be implicated in genetic research as 
a whole, it is not a concept of privacy from which a participant could derive a 
right to access his own information. 
However, the right to privacy is still extremely important in analyzing 
issues of genetic information.  One of the remarkable and unique things 
about genetic information is that its scope reaches beyond the individual 
patient in a way that other medical data does not.  The high blood pressure 
of one man may suggest an increased risk of high blood pressure for his 
brother, or his son.65  But this slightly increased risk or implication is 
practically nil and rarely discussed.  It would never, for example, be argued 
that a person should not be told that he has high blood pressure because 
doing so also implicates the privacy of his brother.66  In the case of genetic 
information, however, the presence of a certain genetic mutation can, in 
some instances, amount to a guarantee that a man’s sibling or son has the 
same mutation.  At the very least, the presence of a genetic mutation 
significantly increases the risk of the same mutation existing in family 
 
 62 U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
 63 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (describing 
the “marital relation and marital home” as a “particularly important and sensitive area of 
privacy”). 
 64 Gotkin, 379 F. Supp. at 863. 
 65 See Camila M. de Oliveira et al., Heritability of cardiovascular risk factors in a Brazilian 
population:  Baependi Heart Study, 9 BMC MED. GENETICS art. 32 (2008) (asserting that the 
data collected from their sample of the Brazilian population provides evidence that a 
large proportion of cardiovascular risk factors are explained by genetic factors). 
 66 See e.g., Strand, supra note 27, at 38. 
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members’ DNA.67  And so, naturally, the disclosure of a genetic research 
result to a participant does implicate the privacy of his family members.  Here 
is where the Ninth Amendment is relevant to the issue at hand. 
There is another issue that mirrors the concern for privacy of family 
members in genetic research—familial database searches for criminal 
offenses.  When a person is convicted of a crime, in many states his blood 
sample may be banked for better identification in the case of any future 
crimes.  If forensic evidence is subsequently discovered at a crime scene, the 
police department may obtain DNA from the evidence and scan it against 
the databank to identify the offender.  More controversially, however, 
several states allow a familial databank search as well.  In other words, not 
only may the DNA from the crime scene be used to identify the offender in 
the database, it may also be compared with the DNA of convicts to 
determine whether the offender is related to a previously convicted felon.68  A 
Michigan Law Review article argues that this familial searching violates the 
privacy of the family members who did not consent to this search.69  Similar 
to the case at issue in this Comment, the unique and powerful, heritable 
aspects of genetic information put the privacy of family members at the 
forefront of ethical and legal concern. 
Although this Comment will not discuss it at length, the crux of the issue 
becomes not whether the Ninth Amendment right to privacy may afford 
research participants an avenue to pursue right of access claims, but whether 
it precludes potential plaintiffs’ right of access claims because of concerns 
about violating family members’ privacy.70 
 
 67 If a genetic disorder runs in my family, what are the chances that my children will have the 
condition?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook/inheritance/
riskassessment (last visited Jan. 17, 2013). 
 68 Murphy, supra note 61, at 292. 
 69 See id. at 338. 
 70 The analysis is one for a different article.  But a quick look indicates that, were the Ninth 
Amendment to preclude a right of access to genetic research results, implications in 
other arenas would be widespread and negative.  It is an unremarkable and predictable 
feature of family members that they often have certain commonalities.  In the health 
arena, it would be absurd to suggest that a doctor should consider a family member’s 
privacy in diagnosing a patient with a disease that has a heritable element.  In the 
financial arena, it would be equally absurd to suggest that a bank should withhold 
information about a couple’s credit score for determining mortgage status, because 
doing so would reveal to one spouse the financial habits of the other.  In reality, although 
family members’ privacy rights are implicated when considering disclosure of genetic 
research results, those concerns are probably not strong enough to completely preclude a 
claim of right of access. 
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X.  FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CLAIM 
For the First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendment claims, access to medical 
records cases have been used as a barometer in this analysis for determining 
the validity of each type of claim with regard to genetic research results.  The 
courts in the medical records cases have taken the Fourteenth Amendment 
claims most seriously of all the asserted constitutional causes of action.71  In 
addition, the true value underpinning the Fourteenth Amendment is 
implicated in asserting a right of access to genetic research results, in a way 
that the values of the three amendments considered above are not.  The 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is stated in the following 
terms:  “. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . .”72  The piece that is important to 
the instant case is the deprivation of property.  In failing to disclose genetic 
research results to participants, is the state depriving citizens of their 
property without due process of law?  The answer depends on two distinct 
factors.  First, can genetic test results be considered property, and if so, are 
they truly the property of the person from whom the specimen was derived?  
And second, in refusing to disclose those results, is the state depriving the 
citizen of property without due process of law?73 
A.  Property Interest 
Whether or not a person has a property interest in something is a legal 
matter determined not by the Constitution, but by relevant state and local 
law.74  Cases like Moore v. Regents have conclusively determined that no 
property interest exists in profits made from excised bodily tissues.75  In that 
case, the plaintiff was treated at a University of California hospital for a rare 
disease, and his cells were excised and patented by researchers.  The 
researchers made a profit from the patent, and the plaintiff Moore sought to 
claim those profits as his property.  The California court rejected his claim.76  
The situation at issue in this Comment is quite distinct from the issue in 
Moore.  In the case of genetic research results, participants are not requesting 
compensation for profits made from any scientific or medical advancement 
that derive from research on their DNA.  Rather, they are simply requesting 
the test results themselves.  While it cannot logically be argued that the 
 
 71 See, e.g., Gotkin v. Miller, 379 F. Supp. 859, 864–68 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). 
 72 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 73 See Allen v. Egan, 303 F. Supp. 2d 71, 76 (D. Conn. 2004) (analyzing deprivation of 
property as a due process violation). 
 74 Id. at 77. 
 75 See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
 76 Id. at 492. 
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blood or saliva sample or the purified DNA itself is not the property of the 
person from whom it is derived, the test results are a product of the bare 
material plus some degree of effort and laboratory technique and 
technology on the part of another person or people.  And the “property” in 
question is not a tangible object, but rather information in the form of 
either spoken or written words.  Federal courts have held that Fourteenth 
Amendment property interests can be asserted over intangible property,77 so 
the fact that the property in question is intangible is not dispositive here.  
Absent any state or local law to explicitly define it as such, it is unclear 
whether genetic test results are the property of the person to whom they 
pertain. 
However, in several cases, there is relevant state or local law to provide 
the answers.  At least three U.S. states have explicit statutes that state that 
genetic information is the property of the person from whom it is derived.  
Georgia’s law states that “[g]enetic information is the unique property of the 
individual tested.”78  Colorado’s laws state that “[g]enetic information is the 
unique property of the individual to whom the information pertains.”79  
Louisiana’s laws say that “[a]n insured or enrollee’s genetic information is 
the property of the insured or enrollee.”80  And a bill recently introduced in 
Massachusetts states that genetic information is “the exclusive property of 
the individual from whom the information is obtained.”81  It would be 
difficult to argue, were a right of access to genetic research results claim 
brought in either Georgia, Colorado, or Louisiana, that the Fourteenth 
Amendment right to due process upon deprivation of property was not 
implicated.  Property rights derive from state law, and these laws set out 
clearly and explicitly both that genetic information is property, and that it 
belongs to the tested individual. 
There is one case that an opponent of right to access might use to refute 
the clear property interest asserted by the laws of these three states:  
Washington University v. Catalona.82  In Washington, the court of appeals 
confronted the issue of whether donors of biospecimens “retain an 
ownership interest allowing the individuals to direct or authorize the 
transfer of such materials to a third party.”83  The court’s answer was no.84  
 
 77 See, e.g., Davila Lopes v. Soler-Zapata, 916 F. Supp. 118, 119–20 (D.P.R. 1996). 
 78 GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1 (2005). 
 79 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7 (West 1994). 
 80 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1023 (1997). 
 81 Press Release, Forum on Genetic Equity, Landmark Genetic Privacy Bill Introduced on 
Beacon Hill (2011), available at http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/
pageDocuments/5I6QWJYJTE.pdf. 
 82 Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 83 Id. at 673. 
 84 Id. at 676–77. 
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This case constitutes compelling evidence that courts are reluctant to assign 
a property interest in biological tissues or in the products derived from 
them.  Of course, the situation in the instant case is quite different, as the 
property right being asserted is over information rather than the biological 
tissue itself.  Nonetheless, Washington and cases like it represent the greatest 
threat to assigning property rights in genetic information for the purposes 
of Fourteenth Amendment analysis. 
In New Jersey, the legislature attempted to pass a law similar to the 
statutes of Georgia, Louisiana, and Colorado, but the Governor vetoed it.85  
The Governor wrote a lengthy conditional veto message, which explained 
the consequences of creating a property right in genetic information.86  The 
Governor wrote that the establishment of a new property right in genetic 
information would amount to a major shift from current practice, and that it 
would have chilling effects on research practices.87  She enumerated two 
primary concerns.  First, she expressed worry over the potential litigation 
that would ensue when participants sought royalties or compensation for 
any profits derived from research on their DNA.88  And second, she worried 
that “creating a property right would impose a de facto requirement that 
researchers notify anyone whose genetic information was used or is intended 
to be used in the course of research.”89  Current practice dictates that when 
a person donates her DNA to research, the researchers store it in a biobank, 
like the NIH database, dbGap.  Subsequently, any researcher who requests 
access may use the information in the biobank for his or her own study.90  
The Governor of New Jersey, in vetoing a bill to make genetic information 
the property of the donor, feared that every time a researcher wanted to use 
the data in the biobank, the participant would have to be notified.  This is a 
strange and unfounded concern.  There exists a well-developed system of 
informed consent in all research, particularly genetic.  When a participant 
donates DNA to a biobank, the informed consent appropriately notifies the 
participant of the context and types of research that her DNA may assist.  
Because of the role of waiver and consent in the process, even if the 
information were considered property of the person who donated the 
specimen, such a designation would not preclude its unrestricted use for any 
of the projects that the participant was informed might be taking place.  In 
 
 85 Letter from Gov. Christine Todd Whitman to N.J. Senate (Sept. 19, 1996) (on file with 
N.J. Office of Legis. Servs.). 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 2. 
 88 Id. at 2–3. 
 89 Id. at 3. 
 90 Maschke, supra note 37, at 11–12; dbGaP:  GENOTYPES and PHENOTYPES, NAT’L CENTER 
BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO., http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/projects/gap/cgi-bin/about.html 
(last visited Feb. 3, 2013). 
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fact, a designation of genetic information as property affords its owner much 
greater control over its use in various contexts.91 
So is there any merit to the New Jersey Governor’s argument?  Since only 
a handful of states have considered making a law that would designate 
genetic information as property, it can be safely assumed that doing so is not 
a popular concept.  Perhaps legislatures in other states have concerns similar 
to the concerns expressed in New Jersey.  However, the consequence with 
the greatest potential impact would be the implications for Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rights.  If the information is the property of the 
participant, then the participant should be able to ask for it back.92  
Currently, federal regulation requires participants be given the opportunity 
to withdraw consent and remove their DNA and information from a biobank 
at any time.93  But while withdrawing the information deprives the institution 
of the property, it does not, strictly speaking, return the property to its owner. 
Scholars have weighed in as well on whether genetic information should 
be considered property.  For example, Catherine Valerio Barrad describes 
the various common law elements of a property interest and explains that 
genetic information in fact shares each of these elements.94  Catherine 
Valerio Barrad is one author, among others, who describes the features of 
property ownership, including exclusive possession, control over use, 
alienability and devisability.95  She goes on to explain how, at one point or 
another, the person to whom the genetic information pertains does enjoy all 
of these rights in it, thus fitting into the common law picture of property 
ownership.  In addition, she uses the Restatement of Property and its 
description of various types of property ownership to assert that genetic 
information fits the definition of property as it was formally understood.96  
Jeffery Lawrence Weeden, in another article on the subject, appeals to a 
moral sensibility, rather than a legal one, in asserting that genetic 
information should be considered property.97  He describes the potential 
 
 91 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 332-I:1 (2011) (providing that, in New Hampshire, individuals 
have a property interest in the information in their medical records and are thus entitled 
to that information upon request). 
 92 See Catherine M. Valerio Barrad, Genetic Information and Property Theory, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 
1037, 1058–59, 1086 (1993) (arguing for the recognition of protectable property interests 
in genetic information). 
 93 Informed Consent Elements Tailored to Genomics Research, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., 
http://www.genome.gov/27026589 (last updated May 19, 2012). 
 94 Barrad, supra note 92, at 1040. 
 95 Id. at 1049. 
 96 Id. at 1053. 
 97 See Jeffery Lawrence Weeden, Genetic Liberty, Genetic Property:  Protecting Genetic Information, 
4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 611, 616 (2006) (arguing that recognition of genetic information as 
protectable property “would exclude others from taking, using, receiving, selling, or 
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pitfalls and abuses of the recent explosion in scientific knowledge about 
genetic information, and explains that an individual’s liberty with regards to 
his DNA is best protected not under a privacy regime, but under a property 
regime.98  The author argues that privacy law is an ever-changing and 
unstable force, and that property law by contrast is rigid and well-
established.  Therefore, he claims, categorizing genetic information as 
property affords citizens greater protection under the law.99 
By contrast, Professor Sonia Suter argues that the privacy regime is 
perfectly adequate to protect genetic research participants, and that moving 
to a property regime strips the medical research process of its tenets of trust 
and affords it instead a sense of commodification and disaggregation.100 
For the purposes of this Comment, the analysis will proceed assuming 
that the right of access claim to genetic research is being asserted in either 
Louisiana, Colorado, or Georgia.  Genetic information being considered 
property is not enough for a plaintiff to prevail.  A court would further 
continue to the due process analysis. 
B.  Deprivation Without Due Process 
If there is an established property right in genetic information, what 
process is due to a research participant who requests that information?  Due 
process analysis has been conducted differently by different courts, and is 
largely a subjective evaluation that depends on how important and 
fundamental the right is that has been deprived.101  Is informed consent 
itself enough “due process” to deprive the participant of her own property? 
What is clear is that the right being sought is extremely important.  A 
right of control over your own being, bodily integrity, and autonomy is a 
right that has been enumerated in many court cases throughout different 
types of disciplines and issues.102  Access to information about your genetic 
code is not as directly related to bodily integrity as some other concerns, 
particularly control over medical treatment and procedures.  But, notably, 
 
otherwise misusing an individual’s genetic information without the express consent of the 
owner”). 
 98 Id. at 617. 
 99 Id. at 661–62. 
100 Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property:  Toward a Deeper Understanding of Genetic 
Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 798 (2004). 
101 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (“[W]e have regularly 
observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and 
liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition . . . .” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
102 See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (recognizing that a 
competent person holds a liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment under 
the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment). 
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the information is one step on the way to better control over your body.  
Without all of the relevant information, how can we make the best and most 
informed personal choices?  Some people would argue that, even with all of 
the information that genetic testing could offer, people’s behaviors and 
practices will hardly change.  Art Caplan, for instance, writes that people 
know they should not smoke, and they know they should bring their weight 
down, but ultimately not much has changed.103  It is not our place, though, 
as lawmakers and policymakers, to decide whether people will do the right 
thing with the information we give them.  We place a high value on allowing 
people to make their own decisions.  Whenever government tries to 
paternalistically prevent information from being disseminated, courts frown 
upon the practice and strike down laws that tend toward such a result.104  
Ultimately, whether a person should be allowed to completely waive his right 
to genetic information about himself should depend on how important that 
information might be.  And the truth is:  the information could be the 
difference between life and death. 
If a court were to hear a right of access to genetic information case, in a 
state where genetic information was considered property, they would be 
hard pressed to hold that informed consent is enough due process to 
deprive a person of that property.  The biggest hurdle for such a plaintiff to 
overcome would be the simple designation of genetic information as 
property.  But there is one other avenue of Fourteenth Amendment analysis 
that a plaintiff could ask the court to employ:  the new fundamental right. 
C.  New Fundamental Right 
Plaintiffs in several cases have attempted to create a new fundamental 
right in something, where no property right or other claim can be 
articulated.105  This type of claim is a long shot, to say the least.  A plaintiff 
using this reasoning would have to argue that the right to information that 
could change the course of medical treatment, resulting in the difference 
between life and death, is so fundamental as to deserve the independent 
protection of the Constitution.  In accepting this logic, a court would be 
happy to avoid the messy and controversial issue of calling genetic 
information property, which may have unintended consequences, as the 
 
103 Art Caplan, Will knowing your DNA motivate you to lose weight?, VITALS (Jan. 10, 2012, 7:00 
PM), http://vitals.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/01/10/10098646-will-knowing-your-dna-
motivate-you-to-lose-weight?. 
104 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764–
65 (1976) (characterizing the free flow of information as indispensible). 
105 See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705–06, 708 (refusing to recognize a liberty interest in 
assisted suicide). 
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Governor of New Jersey articulated.106  But courts are extremely reluctant to 
recognize new fundamental rights.  The most analogous case in which a 
plaintiff attempted to argue this logic was Abigail Alliance for Better Access to 
Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach.107  In this case, the court ruled that 
terminally ill adult patients have no fundamental due process right of access 
to investigational drugs not yet approved by the FDA regardless of the drug’s 
potential life-saving properties.108 
On the one hand, it seems at first glance that if a court refused to create 
a fundamental right of access to life-saving drugs, it would be even less apt to 
create one for potentially life-saving information.  However, in looking more 
closely at the court’s analysis in Abigail Alliance, it becomes clear that the 
primary focus was on whether this country has a long history of protecting 
the right now claimed to be fundamental.  The court in Abigail Alliance 
explains that the government has expressed a strong interest in regulating 
drugs and access to them in the interest of the overall safety of its citizens.109  
In other words, the government’s interest in regulating drug use and in 
assuring safety before any drug is released to the market trumps the right of 
one person’s access to a potentially life-saving drug that has not yet been 
approved.  In the instant case, there is no evidence that the government has 
a long history of expressed interest in withholding information from its citi-
zens.  It certainly does not have a history of expressed interest in withhold-
ing information from citizens about themselves.  In fact, we are an information 
nation.  Our society is centered around providing information and 
maintaining transparency, allowing citizens to make autonomous well-
informed decisions.  There is a potential that, despite the contradictory 
holding in Abigail Alliance, a court would find a new fundamental right of 
access to genetic information.  However, it is more likely that a court will 
find a property interest in genetic information and proceed with the above-
outlined Fourteenth Amendment analysis. 
XI.  COUNTERARGUMENTS AND OBJECTIONS 
One major concern about this proposed right to receive the results of 
genetic research is the burden it places on the (usually state-based, and 
therefore potentially under-budgeted) institutions that possess the 
information.  With the disclosure of any medical information, there are 
 
106 Letter from Governor Christine Todd Whitman to N.J. Senate, supra note 85. 
107 Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 
695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
108 Id. at 697, 712. 
109 See id. at 711 (“[O]ur Nation’s history evidences increasing regulation of drugs as both 
the ability of government to address these risks has increased and the risks associated with 
drugs have become apparent.”). 
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certain safeguards that must be in place.  For example, research institutions 
will likely grapple with whether or not specific geneticists, internists, or 
genetic counselors would need to be assigned to do the notifying.  If new 
staff needs to be hired simply for the purpose of notifying participants of 
research findings, that requirement could place a significant burden on 
hospitals and research institutes.  In addition, systems must be in place to re-
identify DNA and match it up accurately with its “owner.”  Such 
administrative and structural concerns, while not overly burdensome, would 
certainly be a consideration for those who conduct genetic research. 
In addition, if the road towards establishing this kind of right of access 
proceeds in the most likely manner, by classifying genetic information as the 
property of its donor, several unintended consequences might result.  The 
New Jersey Governor who vetoed such a genetic property bill elucidated a 
few of these concerns.110  But it is impossible to conceive of all of the 
potential consequences of such a statute.  One benefit of the alternative to 
establishing a right of access, the new fundamental right, is that it avoids 
classifying genetic information as property in an absolute sense, and focuses 
instead on the issue at hand in the described situation. 
Of the utmost importance is maintaining the ease and wide participation 
of large-scale genetic research studies111, because personalizing diagnosis 
and treatment and individually assessing disease risk are the future of 
medicine.  If establishing a right of access to research results would 
unnecessarily bog down research efforts or burden hospitals or state 
research institutions, then doing so may be ultimately counterproductive. 
Finally, should it become the common practice of researchers and 
institutions to return genetic research results, it is likely that they will find a 
legal basis for such a practice not in the Constitution, but instead in federal 
and state regulation which could center around privacy doctrine, contract 
law, or another legal theory.  The Constitution could be a powerful tool in 
court to argue for such a right, however, it is unlikely to be the ultimate 
driver of change in the practice of returning genetic research results. 
XII.  CONCLUSION 
It is probable that a change in the landscape of genetic research is on 
the horizon.  There is a strong sense, driven by ethics, justice, and American 
societal norms, that withholding potentially life-saving information from 
voluntary research participants is wrong.  Up until now, the researchers who 
work on large-scale genetic research have been hesitant to see it as a project 
 
110 Letter from Gov. Christine Todd Whitman to N.J. Senate, supra note 85. 
111 See PRIVACY AND PROGRESS IN WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING, supra note 24. 
1322 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:4 
 
focusing on the individual patient.  While dreams of personalized genomic 
medicine have been in our minds since watching movies like GATTACA over 
fifteen years ago, scientists have always known that such dreams are decades 
away from becoming a reality.  Accordingly, they have viewed their research 
as pertinent only to large groups of people.  They are statisticians, driven by 
the largest possible numbers to find broad sweeping correlations that might 
direct further study.  And they are right, in some sense.  We don’t know 
enough, yet, about how genetics works to use it as a part of individual 
diagnostic processes.  We are not prepared to say exactly how much more 
often a woman with a BRCA mutation should go in for a mammogram, or 
exactly how much value exists in the knowledge of the mutation.  But 
hesitation on the part of scientists amounts to paternalism and withholding 
of information with which people might make important life-altering 
decisions. 
In short, genetic researchers’ hesitancy to disclose research results to 
participants is understandable, and to do so now would be a little bit 
premature.  But it will not be long before one of the plaintiffs described in 
this Comment starts filing his lawsuit.  Americans demand information from 
their government.  The Constitution is meant to protect our most 
fundamental civil liberties.  What could be more fundamental than the right 
to choose how to live; the right to choose the information we gather, how we 
process that information, and what we do with it; the right to direct our 
medical treatment using the absolute best resources we have at our disposal? 
So the question is:  how will a court react when this case reaches its 
docket?  Hopefully, the analysis provided above gives a taste for the claims 
likely to be considered.  Ultimately, the constitutional claim on which a 
plaintiff is most likely to succeed is a claim arising out of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  Failure to disclose the results of a 
genetic test in the course of research amounts to a deprivation of property 
without due process of law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
